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Abstract 
Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The 
standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a 
detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view 
using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not 
necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but 
whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to 
increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems.  In 
contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more 
likely to increase shareholder value.  
 
Published 
Acheson, G., Campbell, G., Turner, J. and Vanteeva, N., 2016. Corporate ownership, control, 
and firm performance in Victorian Britain. Journal of Economic History, vol. 76, no.1, p.1-
40. 
 
JEL classification: G32, N23 
Keywords: Corporate ownership, Performance, Blockholders, Boards of directors  
 
Graeme G. Acheson
 
 is Professor of Finance, University of Stirling, Stirling Management School, 
Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland. E-mail: graeme.acheson@stir.ac.uk. Gareth Campbell
 
is Lecturer in Finance, 
Queen’s University Belfast, Queen’s Management School, Belfast, BT7 1NN, N. Ireland.  E-mail: 
gareth.campbell@qub.ac.uk. John D. Turner is Professor of Finance and Financial History, Queen’s University 
Belfast, Queen’s Management School, Belfast, BT7 1NN, N. Ireland. E-mail:  j.turner@qub.ac.uk. Nadia 
Vanteeva is a Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of the West of England, Bristol Business School, 
Bristol, BS16 1QY, England. E-mail:  Nadia.Vanteeva@uwe.ac.uk. 
Thanks to the Leverhulme Trust (Grant no. F/00203/Z) for financial support.  Turner also wishes to 
thank Geoff Jones, Walter Friedman, and Harvard Business School for their hospitality at the outset of this 
project.  Thanks to the archivists at the National Archives at Kew, the National Archives of Scotland, and the 
Guildhall Library for all their assistance. Thanks to seminar participants at Queen’s University Belfast, 
University College Dublin, the Perth FRESH conference, and the European Business History Association 
conference for their comments.   
 
 
 
  
2 
 
The commonly accepted view amongst scholars is that in the Victorian and Edwardian eras 
family control of public companies resulted in British public companies performing poorly. It 
is alleged that they had amateurish and unsophisticated managers, and family owners were 
more interested in paying out a substantial proportion of company earnings as dividends 
rather than retaining funds to grow the business (Chandler, 1990, p. 240; Wilson, 1995, p. 
154). Indeed, some scholars have even attributed Britain’s relative economic decline in the 
twentieth century to the problems with family-controlled companies (Elbaum and Lazonick, 
1984; Chandler, 1990).  
Hannah (2007), Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) and Acheson et al. (2015) have 
challenged this  conception or caricature of the UK’s corporate economy in the Victorian and 
Edwardian periods as being dominated by family-owned public firms. These studies find that, 
in many cases, ownership was divorced from control. However, this separation of ownership 
from control may have created an agency problem, in that the executives of these public 
companies mismanaged them, and did not run them in the interests of shareholders. Notably, 
the diffuse ownership structure of British Victorian and Edwardian railways has been 
highlighted as a contributing factor to their poor performance (Crafts et al. 2007, 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 2011).  
We contribute to this debate by examining the relationship between ownership 
structure and different measures of firm performance, using hand-collected data for 345 
Victorian public companies. This unique dataset enables us to test whether diffuse, or family, 
ownership affected firm performance.  
The idea that ownership structure affects corporate performance has a long academic 
pedigree. For example, in their classic study, Berle and Means (1932) argued that the 
separation of ownership from control created an incentive problem in that managers would 
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not necessarily act in the best interests of owners.
1
 Large blockholders, which we define as 
someone who owns 10 per cent or more of the company, may help to reduce this managerial 
agency problem because they have the incentive and power to monitor managers (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986, 1997). However, blockholders, in turn, may put their own interests ahead 
of those of minority shareholders (Chandler 1990, p. 292).   
Conceptually, directors who are independent of large owners could protect minority 
shareholders from expropriation by blockholders. However, the perception of boards of 
directors in the Victorian era is somewhat mixed. A contemporary judge believed that 
independent directors assured minority shareholders (Kennedy, 1987, p. 126), whereas a 
contemporary legal writer saw independent directors as incompetent or pre-occupied 
(Chadwyck-Healey, 1884) or ornamental rather than playing any useful economic function 
(Campbell and Turner, 2011; Chandler, 1990, p. 242).          
Our findings imply that it is not ownership itself which mattered in Victorian Britain, 
but rather the interaction between ownership and control. Although broad ownership 
measures are unrelated to firm performance, the presence of large active family blockholders 
is associated with a better operating performance, as measured by a higher return on assets 
(ROA). A possible explanation for this is that large active family blockholders in Victorian 
Britain effectively reduced managerial expropriation by helping to mitigate agency costs. 
However, this does not translate into greater market values, as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
possibly reflecting minority shareholders’ fears of blockholder expropriation.2  By way of 
contrast, the presence of directors who were not blockholders has little effect on operating 
                                                          
1
 Lipartito and Morii (2010) question whether Berle and Means (1932) were concerned about the classic agency 
problem. Rather, they argue that that Berle and Means were more concerned about conflicts between 
blockholders.  
2
 Tobin's Q measures how investors value the company and is widely used as a performance measure in 
empirical corporate finance studies (Davies et al. 2005; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). It is the ratio of the 
market value of the company’s common and preferred equity and debt to the book value of the company’s 
assets.  
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performance but is associated with relatively higher market values. This implies that 
independent directors in Victorian Britain may have provided credible commitments against 
family blockholder expropriation, but were less effective at reducing managerial 
expropriation. 
This article also contributes to the literature on the evolution of the UK capital market 
by looking at control of public companies following the liberalisation of incorporation law in 
1856.
3
  To date, the extant literature has focused on the performance and growth of the equity 
market (Grossman, 2002), the expansion of the investor franchise (Rutterford et al., 2011), 
and the development of stock exchanges (Thomas, 1973; Michie, 1999). We contribute to the 
understanding of how the UK capital market transformed from one where shareholders had 
direct and personal knowledge of a company’s operation and management to one where 
shareholders did not have such personal knowledge.  Additionally, this paper augments 
studies which look at the ownership-performance nexus from an historical perspective.  For 
example, Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2013) find that, for the largest UK companies in 1911, 
diffuse ownership did not operate against shareholders’ interests, suggesting that agency 
problems were somehow reduced.
4
   
Examining corporate ownership structure in the Victorian era is enlightening for 
contemporary economists because the period under examination was one where the investor 
protection environment was very weak by modern standards (Campbell and Turner, 2011).
5
 
Since investor protection laws can affect ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999), 
                                                          
3
 On the liberalisation of incorporation law, see Cottrell (1980) and Taylor (2006).   
4
 Hilt (2008) looks at New York corporations in the 1820s and finds that the voting power of management is 
negatively related to firm value.  
5
 Statutory companies registered under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act (1845) scored five out of six 
in the La Porta et al (1998) anti-director rights index, (Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2015). They are not included 
in this study.  The Companies Act (1862) scored one out of six in the anti-director rights index. All of the 
companies in our study were registered under this legislation. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that 
companies registered under the 1862 Act voluntarily adopted anti-director rights in order to list on stock 
exchanges or attract capital from investors. (see Foreman-Peck and Hannah 2015).     
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the Victorian period provides us with a natural experiment where we can observe the 
relationship between structure and performance in a laissez-faire company law regime.  
 
BACKGROUND, HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
The liberalisation of incorporation in the UK 
Prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the right to incorporate in the UK was controlled by Parliament and the Crown. From 1844 
onwards, there were  a series of acts which made incorporation, and limited liability, easier to 
obtain. The 1862 Companies Act saw a consolidation of existing pieces of legislation and 
was the capstone on the liberalisation process. The ownership and control of the companies 
incorporated under the 1862 Act and raised share capital from the market are the focus of this 
study.  
 
Manager-owner conflict 
Many of the companies incorporated under the 1862 Companies Act had diffuse 
ownership (Acheson et al. 2015).  Such a separation of ownership from control allows 
specialisation in share ownership (or residual risk-bearing) and in managerial control (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  With the liberalisation of UK incorporation law, this specialisation was 
available to every firm. However, this specialisation may give rise to an agency problem, in 
that managers pursue their own interests and do not act in the interests of shareholders (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Examples of managerial inefficiency in the 
late Victorian era have been highlighted by a number of authors looking at the railway 
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industry (Arnold and McCartney, 2005; Crafts et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2011).
6
 A possible 
solution to the managerial agency problem may be provided by monitors who have the 
incentive to collect information about the firm, and the power to influence managers.  
 In this study, we categorise the key monitors into three groups: large active family 
blockholders, large passive blockholders, and directors who are not blockholders.  A 
blockholder is a shareholder with more than 10%. We hypothesise that the presence of large 
active blockholders will reduce the conflict between managers and owners, and raise 
profitability as measured by Return on Assets (ROA). These large active blockholders have 
the incentive and the power to reduce managerial agency costs and raise operating profits. 
They may run the firm on a day-to-day basis, or at least be closely involved in it, ensuring 
that all other managers and employees maximise their efforts, and minimise costs. On the 
other hand, large passive blockholders, with less involvement in the monitoring of managers 
will not have such an effect. 
Directors who are not blockholders often have little impact on the manager-owner 
conflict. In dispersed-ownership companies, Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that it is 
natural that the most influential members of the board will be internal managers as they have 
the most information about the firm, and they are also well placed to nominate outside 
directors. Alternatively, the directors may be independent of management, but they do not 
have the day-to-day involvement in the firm which would be required to reduce the agency 
problem. Their real influence would be at a strategic level, on major issues which came 
before the board, not on everyday issues. 
To summarise, we use Return on Assets (ROA) as our measure of operating 
performance to show how efficiently a company uses its assets to earn a profit.  The greater 
                                                          
6
 Ownership data was not collected by the Registrar of Companies for statutory companies and therefore 
railways are not included in our sample.  
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the managerial expropriation, the lower the return on  assets.. If large active blockholders can 
reduce managerial expropriation, then, ceteris paribus, ROA will be higher. On the other 
hand, large passive blockholders and directors who are not blockholders should have had no 
impact on ROA. 
 
Blockholder-minority shareholder conflict  
Although large active blockholders may be able to discipline managers, they may 
focus on their own interests and attempt to maximise these at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This introduces an additional risk factor which 
investors must consider in their valuations. If they are concerned about expropriation, then 
the high profitability earned in companies with large active blockholders may not necessarily 
translate into higher share prices. However, if investors feel protected from expropriation 
then they may reward the firm with a relatively higher valuation. The blockholder-minority-
shareholder conflict generally concerns strategic decisions, rather than day-to-day 
management, and would be typically dealt with at board level. Consequently, having an 
independent board could help promote good practice and increase shareholder value. Boards 
with more directors who  are not blockholders could be viewed as a commitment that there is 
a low risk of blockholder expropriation, as collusion would be much more difficult. The 
result is that, ceteris paribus, valuations (as measured by Tobin's Q) should be higher. 
There were numerous ways in which blockholders could put their own interests before 
those of minority shareholders Firstly, the active blockholder could engage in tunnelling (or 
related party transations)
 7
, by getting the company to lend money at low rates, or buy assets 
at inflated prices. These would typically affect only the balance sheet, rather than 
                                                          
7
 See Gordon et al. (2004) and Cheung et al. (2009). Taylor (2013, pp.215-7, 223) notes several examples of this 
type of practice.  
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profitability, in the short-term. Another form of tunnelling can occur when the blockholder 
gets the company to trade with other firms that he owns The company is then charged inflated 
prices and the benefits are earned by the blockholder’s other firms, at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. Even if this did not occur immediately but investors understood that it 
could occur in the future, it would mean that current profitability could remain high, but the 
share price would be discounted to reflect the additional risk. An example of this type of 
tunnelling was seen in the case of the Grosvenor Hotel; R. C. Drew was the largest 
shareholder and exercised control over a small board, who colluded with him to obtain most 
of the supplies for the hotel from a butcher, grocer, and laundry all owned by Drew.
8
  
Blockholders could also put themselves first by withholding information. As insiders, 
they had detailed knowledge about the performance of the firm, which they could use to 
inform their decisions on whether to buy or sell stock in it (insider trading),  or  to deny much 
of this information to others, placing the minority shareholders at a disadvantage. For 
example, The Financial Times remarked about the Globe Cotton Spinning, a company in our 
sample, that it paid a dividend by forwarding ‘a cheque to each shareholder for whatever 
amount may be due to him at a rate the Directors fix on … Apparently no accounts are 
circulated … No information is obtainable beyond the capital subscribed and a few office 
particulars’.9 This secrecy would tend to raise the risk for minority shareholders, and lower 
valuations, despite the profitability of the company. 
Active blockholders could also continue in their position within the company, even 
when it was no longer performing well. The removal of a large active blockholder, as 
managing director, would likely have been much more difficult than the removal of someone 
who was not a blockholder. The Financial Times reported on the Aylesbury Dairy implying 
                                                          
8
 Financial Times, Feb 21, 1898, p. 7. 
9
 Financial Times, 23 Jan 1901, p. 4. 
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that the severe difficulties it faced were related to the past decisions of its active blockholder, 
G.M. Allender, who it referred to as the ‘Life Managing Director’10 A similar problem could 
arise if the active blockholder used his power to appoint some of his family as his 
replacement. In a similar vein, if there was a risk that the blockholder would engage in 
empire-building, it could be detrimental to shareholder value. Foreman-Peck and Hannah 
(2015, p.20) note the example of Samuel Waring who engaged in a disastrous expansion and 
acquisition plan with the furniture company Waring & Gillow. Finally, and most blatantly, 
the active blockholders could attempt to deceive the minority shareholders by falsifying 
financial statements, to attract capital.  
 The potential for these abuses by large active blockholders, even if they did not 
materialise, raised the risks faced by minority shareholders. We hypothesise that even though 
large active blockholders may raise profitability (ROA), they do not necessarily raise firm 
value (Tobin’s Q).  Large passive blockholders, who have no effect on profitability, should 
have no effect on value, because they do not exercise enough power to engage in 
expropriation. However, having a board with many directors who are not themselves 
blockholders will significantly increase the value of the firm, as collusion on expropriation 
would be much more difficult. If their focus is on major strategic decisions, rather than the 
minutiae of day-to-day decisions, such directors may have little influence on profitability, but 
they can provide safeguards against systematic expropriation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Financial Times, Nov 16, 1891, p. 2. Guinnane et al. (2014) have found that 26.2 percent of their sample of 
mainly private companies ‘specified in their articles that certain named directors would serve for a long period 
of years or even for life’. 
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Empirical framework   
We examine the relationship between the governance structure and performance of 
non-statuatory public companies in Victorian and Edwardian England.  Our estimating 
equation takes the form  
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =∝ +𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (1) 
 
We use ROA and Tobin’s Q as performance measures and dependent variable  in our post-
1880 performance sample.  ROA is measured as:   
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝐵𝑉 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(2) 
and Tobin’s Q is calculated as follows: 
𝑄 =
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑞 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑉 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(3) 
where MVEq = year-end market value of firm’s common stock;  Pref = year-end value of 
firm’s preferred stock; Debt = year-end value of firm’s total debt; and BV Assets = total 
assets of firm.  Controls on age, size, location, growth, industry, ownership structure and 
corporate control measures are described in the next section.   
 The main threat to validity which has been identified in studies of ownership structure 
is that of causality: does ownership structure affect performance or performance ownership 
structure(Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p.221) 
argue that ‘compensation plans, insider trading possibilities, and corporate takeovers suggest 
that firm performance may influence ownership structure as well as be influenced by it’. 
However, there are several reasons to believe that reverse causality in a Demsetz and 
Villalonga world was not a major issue in the Victorian context.  Even if some related-party 
transactions or tunnelling could be seen as affecting compensation, directors in our firms 
were paid said salaries and performance related bonuses, none of which resulted directly in 
11 
 
changes of ownership, unlike modern equity-based plans.  Second, hostile takeover bids and 
accumulation of stakes by potential acquirers were very rare in this era (Cheffins 2008, p. 79; 
Hannah 1974; Hannah 1976, p. 150; Hannah 2011, p. 241).  Third, Braggion and Moore 
(2013) find that while insider trading was not illegal, it rarely happened (Braggion and 
Moore, 2013). Fourth, institutional investors were very small players and typically only 
invested in fixed-interest securities such as corporate and government bonds, not equities 
(Cheffins, 2008, p. 190; Raynes, 1928).
11
   
Indeed, in the Victorian context, it was difficult for changes in ownership structure to 
occur quickly, as stock was often not as actively traded.
12
 This meant that large one-off 
changes in ownership structure were not possible. We are not suggesting that blockholder 
changes were uncommon. However, it would have taken investors a long time to accumulate 
a block-holding stake in a company to fundamentally alter the ownership structure. 
The absence of such mechanisms does not completely eliminate the reverse causality 
issue. One potential source of reverse causality is where a blockholder may be more likely to 
take a position on the board when companies are more profitable. In a robustness check, we 
find very little evidence of large passive blockholders rotating in or out of directorships, but 
we cannot conclusively rule this possibility out. However, it could be argued that 
blockholders might be more likely to take a seat on the board if profitability was low and  the 
company was not performing well,  in the hope of improving performance.  A finding that 
active blockholders are associated with high profitability runs counter to what would be 
expected from results driven by endogeneity. 
As an additional robustness check, we use a different measure of performance which 
should be less prone to the reverse causality problem, namely firm outcome. It seems 
                                                          
11
 We found 64 different investment trusts who owned shares in our sample, but their shareholdings were small. 
12
 For example, the median number of trades per annum in the 1870s for the 14 UK banks reported in Acheson 
and Turner (2008, pp.136-7) is only 53 i.e., one share trade per week.  Also, stock repurchases were extremely 
uncommon prior to 1887, when they became illegal (Turner et al., 2013). 
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plausible that ownership structure could affect the final status of the company. However, it is 
unlikely that the future state of the company would affect current ownership. Firm outcome 
differs from our other measures of performance, ROA and Tobin’s Q, in that conceptually, 
we are measuring performance or success purely in terms of survival (Alchian, 1950).  We 
are posing the following two questions: (a) Was a specific type of ownership structure a 
survivable trait of firms over the long run? (b) Did a certain type of ownership structure make 
it more likely for a firm to fail for explicit performance reasons?
13
    
Although reverse causality should not be a major issue in this analysis, there may be 
unobserved factors that jointly cause performance and ownership structure. There may also 
be issues in terms of whether certain conditions led to different ownership configurations. For 
example, a firm founder who was likely to obtain high rents, and therefore high ROA, may 
keep a large block of shares to extract as much value as possible. The founder of a firm with  
high capital expenditures, and who needed to repeatedly raise more capital from minority 
shareholders, would be more likely to initially configure the firm with independent directors. 
For firms which were expected to be more successful, there may have been stronger demand 
for shares from subscribers, so that ownership became less concentrated. These issues mean 
that, ultimately, the most that we can say about any relationships we find is that they are 
correlations, and do not necessarily imply causality.    
 
DATA 
 
Sample  
Our main sources of ownership data are the Companies Registration Office files held 
at the National Archives in London (BT31 series) and the National Archives of Scotland 
                                                          
13
 This is in the spirit of Fama and Jensen (1983) who see firms or organisations not surviving if they select the 
wrong ownership structure at their origin. 
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(BT2 series).  Companies registered under the 1856 and the 1862 Companies Act were 
required to return a list of their ordinary and preference shareholders to the Registrar of 
Companies annually.  Up until 1970, whenever a company was dissolved in the UK, its 
ownership records were placed within the Companies Registration Office files.
14
   
Because we are interested in the ownership of publicly-listed companies, we collected 
the names of all UK companies issuing common stock between 1862 and 1900 from the 
Course of the Exchange (COE) and the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM). Unfortunately 
ownership returns were extensively weeded by archivists so that, for any one firm, only a 
small sample of years was preserved. We collected ownership returns for 1865, 1870, 1880-
1884, 1890 and 1900 or one or two years either side of these sample years if the return 
existed.  If a company had ownership returns which fell outside the selected sample years, we 
collected a return for each decade between 1860 and 1900, where available.   
The ownership returns report the cash-flow rights of shareholders, but not the voting 
rights of shareholders or the names of directors.  We therefore hand collected data on each 
company’s voting rights for each year for which we had an ownership return from Burdett’s 
Official Intelligence (BOI), Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (SEOI) or a company’s 
articles of association, usually available with the ownership returns. The names of directors 
for the relevant years were obtained from the same sources. In order to ascertain the share 
ownership of each director, we manually checked each set of ownership returns. 
 As noted above, we use three performance measures.  The accounting data to 
calculate Tobin’s Q and ROA comes from Burdett’s collection of company accounts stored in 
the Guildhall Library in London, whilst the market value of the firm’s securities is obtained 
                                                          
14
 Most nineteenth-century companies registered under these two Acts dissolved. Their ownership records, if 
they survived, are in these archives.    
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from the December issue of the relevant IMM.
15
  As Burdett’s accounting data is only 
available from 1880 onwards, our first sample is restricted to the post-1880 period and 
contains 252 firm-years, consisting of 186 unique firms, 11 with three observations, 44 with 
two observations, and 131 with one observation.  34.1 per cent of our sample comes from the 
1880s, 40.5 per cent from the 1890s, and 25.4 per cent from 1900-1901. The four most 
represented industry sectors, as shown in Appendix 1, are industrial and commercial firms 
comprising 25.8 per cent of our sample, banks comprising 15.5 per cent, mortgage and 
finance companies comprising 13.9 per cent, and iron, coal and steel companies comprising 
12.3.  The remainder of the sample is spread across eight other industry sectors. We obtain 
survival/failure date from the Register of Defunct Companies, which lists any company 
delisted from the stock exchange from 1875 onwards with the reason for delisting.
16
  We  are 
able to trace the year of delisting as well as the ultimate fate of  344 companies.   
Compared to the total population of publicly-quoted companies listed in BOI, our 
sample is a relatively small proportion.  According to Essex-Crosby’s data, there were 1,585 
and 2,581 non-railway companies listed in 1885 and 1895 respectively (Jefferys 1977, p. 
458). In terms of the number of unique companies quoted in the COE and IMM between 1862 
and 1901, we estimate that there were 2,664 companies excluding railways, quoted at some 
point during this period. In Appendix 1, we present a detailed breakdown of how our sample 
compares to non-railway companies listed in the IMM. The median par value of IMM firms in 
1880 was £150,000 and in 1900 was £250,000. Our performance data sample firms have a 
median par value of £150,000, whilst our final status sample firms have a median par value of 
£133,099. Our sample is more weighted towards small and medium-sized public companies. 
When compared to all of the non-railway companies in BOI, which included more of the 
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 Because the IMM, does not contain the market value of some corporate bonds or preferred shares, we have to 
resort to using their book values as per Davies et al. (2005).     
16
 We use the London Gazette and Edinburgh Gazette as supplementary sources. 
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small firms, our sample is fairly representative. The average paid-up capital of our companies 
for the ROA and Tobin’s Q sample is £256,700, and for the final status sample is £216,560, 
which are similar to the average paid-up capital of non-railway companies in BOI in 1885 
and 1895, which were £209,752 and £262,340 respectively (Jefferys 1977, p. 458). 
There were some substantial changes in industrial composition during this period, as 
seen from Appendix 1, but the only industry which seems to be under-represented in our 
sample in both 1880 and 1900 is mining. The commercial and industrial sector, which 
consisted mainly of manufacturing and processing companies, is the largest sector in our 
sample, which is unsurprising since this was a growth sector in the stock market (Grossman 
2002, p. 130). In terms of those listed in BOI, our sample under-represents the commercial 
and industrial sector and over-represents banking. This is again unsurprising because banks 
were more likely than other companies to have a large shareholder base and have their shares 
traded on public markets, whereas industrial and commercial public companies were more 
likely to be small and not regularly traded.     
 
Ownership variables  
The richness of our data permits a wide variety of measures of ownership structure. 
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we looks at the 
ownership of the five largest shareholders as this may proxy the ability of shareholders to 
control managers.  We can also construct a Herfindahl Index of ownership. We describe 
ownership by the board of directors as a whole, and of insiders which embraces both directors 
and blockholders.  We then split this insider category into three types of individuals. Large 
active blockholders (i.e., individuals who owned more than 10 per cent of capital or voting 
rights and were on the board), large passive blockholders (i.e., individuals who owned more 
16 
 
than 10 per cent of capital or voting rights and were not on the board), and directors who 
were not blockholders.  The variables are described in Appendix 2.   
 
<<Insert Table 1>> 
 
 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1, VoteLargest5 and VoteHHI variables 
both indicate that corporate ownership was relatively diffuse in our sample. Notably, the 
average of the VoteLargest5 variable at 21.44 per cent is very similar to the capital owned by 
the five largest shareholders in modern studies (e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Davies et 
al., 2005; and Maury, 2006).  In our regression analysis, we take log values of VoteLargest5 
and VoteHHI to obtain symmetric distributions. Directors, on average, control a fairly small 
proportion of voting rights in our sample, with the averages of VoteDir being 11.53 per cent, 
not dissimilar to that reported by Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) for the largest 337 
British firms in 1911.  We also summarize the ownership of large active blockholders who 
were directors, the ownership of large passive blockholders who were not directors, the 
ownership of directors who were not blockholders, and the ownership of all insiders i.e., 
directors plus large blockholders.  The mean and median of VoteInsiders, which measures the 
votes of both directors and large shareholders, are 14.38 and 9.06 per cent respectively. 
ActiveBlock and PassiveBlock averages  imply that a minority of firms had someone who was 
a large blockholder.  However, the mean votes controlled by those blockholders was 24.87 
per cent, and for those firms that had a passive blockholder, the mean votes controlled by 
those blockholders was 24.90 per cent. The DirOnlyVote variables show that directors who 
were not large blockholders, on average, held a total of 7.78 per cent of voting rights between 
them. 
17 
 
Although not reported separately, there is little difference between the concentration 
of capital and voting, and, if anything, voting is slightly less concentrated than capital.   Many 
companies had voting regimes with caps limiting the total votes of each investor or which 
skewed the voting scale in favour of small investors and discriminated against large 
shareholders (Campbell and Turner, 2011).
17
  
In Table 2 we describe how ownership by directors and large blockholders varies 
across industry.  Four things are worthy of note.  First, very few firms in any sectors had 
large blockholders.  Second, there was a very small propensity for directors to be large 
blockholders, but a higher propensity (60.5 per cent) for large blockholders to be directors, 
which implies that the majority of such shareholders wanted to maintain control over the 
company. Third, the vast majority of directors were not blockholders, with the average board 
having 6.1 directors and, on average, 5.9 of these were not large blockholders. Fourth, there 
is some variation across industries in terms of the percentage of voting rights controlled by 
large blockholders, with breweries, iron, coal and steel companies, and industrial and 
commercial companies having higher blockholder ownership than other industries. 
18
       
 
<<Insert Table 2>> 
 
Performance variables 
As noted above the main performance measures are ROA and Tobin’s Q.  In our 
regression analysis, we winsorize each of the variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to deal 
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 Such voting regimes were common elsewhere in this period (Hilt, 2008, 2013; Pargendler and Hansmann, 
2013; Musacchio, 2009).   
18
 Perhaps the high levels of fixed and firm-specific assets meant that there was less need for large owners to 
commit to other stakeholders by having a greater separation of ownership from control (Mayer, 2013) because  
the infungible assets meant that it was more difficult to expropriate employees, suppliers, creditors, and 
customers, thereby reducing the need for large owners to credibly commit to these stakeholders by separating 
ownership from control. 
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with outliers and  use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted ROA whereby 
Tobin’s Q, and ROA are adjusted using industry averages as per the industrial sectors in 
Table 2.
19
  Our robustness check on performance is firm status. 
The Register of Defunct Companies explains why firms delisted. We use this 
information to create variables about the ultimate fate or final status of our sample 
companies.  We find that 41 per cent of firms merged with other companies and disappeared 
as separate entities; 5 per cent of firms were wound up by court orders; 15 per cent of firms 
were removed from the stock exchange yearbook; 24 per cent of firms were voluntarily 
wound up by their shareholders; 16 per cent of firms were reconstructed (see Table 1)  
In terms of ex ante optimality for shareholders, if a firm were to disappear, the worst 
outcome would have been a court order to wind up, followed by a voluntary winding up. In 
the former, larger losses would usually have been incurred by shareholders, whereas the 
losses may not have been as severe in the case of a voluntary winding up. Removal from the 
stock exchange yearbook usually occurred because a firm had failed, which again suggests 
poor performance. The best outcome would be a merger.   The extensive rationalisations and 
merger movements in many of the industries at the turn of the twentieth century (Sykes, 
1926; Supple, 1970, pp. 273-96; Hannah 1974, 1976) suggest that few mergers were for 
explicit performance reasons.  Reconstruction of companies also does not necessarily imply 
performance issues with firms, and would lie between the best outcome (i.e., merger) and the 
worst outcomes (i.e., winding up or removal).
20
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 We also run our regressions with unadjusted measures and industry dummies, but this does not change our 
results. 
20
 This involved raising new capital or reorganising existing capital or, sometimes, renaming and re-registering 
the firm. 
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We include two variables to capture governance and control,  Board size (NumDir) 
ranged from 3 to 23, with a mean and median of 6.0.
21
   Independence is captured by the 
number of directors who are not also large blockholders (DirOnlyNum)   and ranges from 2 to 
23, with a mean of 5.8 and median of 5.0 (See Table 1). 
We include two time variables. First, the year in which the ownership census in our 
dataset was conducted, to capture a time effect (OwnDate).  Second, we use the establishment 
year of the company to capture the maturity of the firm (EstDate). We control for firm size by 
including the natural logarithm of a firm’s paid-up capital in our regressions (Size) and a 
leverage ratio (LTDebt).
22
     
Since directors in this era were usually required to own a certain number of shares, 
which was usually low relative to the capital of the firm (Campbell and Turner, 2011), we 
include a director qualification variable (DirectorQual) because this may have affected the 
relationship between ownership and performance.  The mean, median, and range suggests 
that director qualifications were not a high proportion of the firm’s par (paid-up) capital.  
Indeed, on average, 29.3 per cent of shareholders had enough shares to qualify as a director.      
We also control for whether or not a firm had London headquarters because such 
firms may have had greater access to capital markets and oversight by professional investors 
(HeadLondon).  As our data comes from two different archives, we control for any possible 
effect this might have on the relationship between ownership and performance by including a 
binary variable which takes the value of one if our firm was Scottish, zero otherwise.  In our 
regressions where ownership is regressed on Tobin’s Q, we also control for the return on 
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 The mean and median leverage ratios in Table 1 are low compared to the Essex-Crosby data for all companies 
listed in BOI in 1885 and 1895, where the respective averages are 20.7 and 29.0 per cent (Jefferys 1977, p. 458). 
There are at least two reasons for this.  First, we have an over-representation of banks and other financial 
companies which did not have long-term debt in their capital structure.  Second, some public companies, such as 
breweries, issued only debentures to the public and are therefore not in our sample, but are included in the 
Essex-Crosby figures. 
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assets (ROA), allowing us to analyse the determinants of firm value after controlling for 
differences in operating performance. 
  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 3 contains pairwise correlations between our performance and ownership 
variables.   Although there is a positive correlation between Q and ROA, they are not highly 
correlated, suggesting that they are measuring different aspects of firm performance.  Second, 
ActiveBlock is positively correlated with ROA, implying having directors with more than 10 
per cent of the capital are associated with higher accounting profits.  Third, there is a positive 
correlation between Tobin’s Q and DirOnlyNum, implying  that boards with more directors 
who are not also large blockholders are associated with a higher Tobin’s Q.   
In Table 4, we show the results for various specifications of voting concentrations on 
ROA (panel A) and Tobin’s Q (panel B).  VoteLargest5 and VoteHHI, are uncorrelated with 
ROA implying that ownership structure, in a very broad sense, is unrelated to operating 
performance as measured by ROA. However, the positive coefficient on the VoteDir variable, 
which remains even when control variables are introduced, suggests that greater ownership in 
the hands of directors is associated with higher ROA. In panel B, we find a suggestion of a 
negative relationship between the broad ownership measures and Tobin’s Q, but only one of 
the ownership measures is weakly significant.  
 
<<Insert Tables 3 & 4 >> 
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 The results also reveal that NumDir (board size) has little effect on ROA, but a highly 
significant positive effect on Q.  One interpretation is that larger boards may have acted as a 
check on large blockholders expropriating minority shareholders, and was therefore valued 
by them.  Overall these results imply a complex relationship between ownership by large 
shareholders, ownership by directors, and the number of directors.
23
 
To analyse the interaction between these factors more precisely, each insider is 
categorised as either an active blockholder, a passive blockholder, or a director who was not a 
blockholder. We begin with a simple difference-in-means test between companies with and 
without each type of blockholder, and above and below median numbers of individuals who 
were solely directors. (See Table 5). We classify a blockholder as having 10 per cent of 
voting rights, but since our findings may be sensitive to this definition, we check the 
robustness of our results using 5 and 20 per cent levels.  (see Holderness, 2009, p. 1399). The 
ROA for companies with at least one active blockholder is statistically and economically 
greater than that for companies without, irrespective of what definition of large blockholder 
we use.  In addition, Tobin’s Q for companies with above median number of individuals who 
were solely directors is statistically greater than that for companies below the median for all 
three definitions.
24
 
<<Insert Table 5>> 
 
 In Tables 6 and 7, we refine our analysis of the interaction between performance and 
governance.  The most noteworthy finding in Table 6 is the positive and statistically 
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 The ownership concentration measures are based on voting rights.  For the sake of robustness, we also use 
cash-flow rights as a measure of ownership concentration and find that the results, are similar to those in Table 
4. 
24
 Changing the definition of a large shareholder to someone holding five per cent of stock creates a substantial 
increase in the number of individuals classified as large blockholders, with the 20 per cent definition reducing 
them.   
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significant coefficient on ActiveBlock, which implies that firms with blockholders who are 
also directors perform better in terms of ROA than other firms. The coefficient on 
ActiveBlock suggests that a one per cent increase in the votes of active blockholders increases 
ROA by about 0.3 per cent.  This is consistent with the idea that such owners have the 
incentives and power to make sure than the firm is efficiently run to produce a high ROA.   
 Previous research has indicated that the relationship between ownership and 
performance may be non-linear (Morck et al., 1988 and McConnell and Servaes, 1990), so 
we include a squared term (ActiveBlockSq). The results indicate that ActiveBlockSq is 
significant and negative, indicating that active blockholder ownership is beneficial up to a 
point, but may become less useful at very high levels. Differentiating and solving suggests 
that the optimum level of active blockholder ownership is 27.1 per cent. Because the 
difference between voting rights and cashflow rights may be influential (Claessens et al., 
2002 and Gompers et al., 2009), we include the ActiveCashWedge variable, which calculates 
cashflow rights minus voting rights for active blockholders.  This is not significant. In 
robustness regressions, reported later, we find that using capital concentration does not 
change the results.  
 We go further, attempting to determine whether the active blockholders were 
fulfilling the role of the primary manager, essentially acting as a CEO.
25
 We assume that 
Chairman fulfils the role of a modern CEO, unless another Managing Director (MD) is 
named in which case that person is seen as CEO. In our sample, we have 34 firm-years with 
active blockholders where either the Chairman and/or MD is named. Of these, in 18 firm-
years the role of CEO was taken on by the active blockholder. These could be thought of as 
family firms, where the largest owner was also the manager. To investigate their impact on 
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 With few cases where anyone is identified simply as Manager,  we used judgement as to what different titles 
actually meant. 
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performance, we split our ActiveBlock variable into two parts, ActiveCEOBlock and 
ActiveNotCEOBlock, and re-run the regressions (see column 7 of Table 6).  We find that both 
have a similar positive and significant impact on ROA.  
 
<<Insert Tables 6 & 7>> 
 
Despite the positive impact that active blockholders have on ROA, there appears to be 
an insignificant relationship between ActiveBlock and Tobin’s Q, (Table 7), implying that 
minority shareholders do not value having a large blockholder who is also a director.  The 
coefficient on the PassiveBlock variable suggest that large shareholders who do not take on a 
monitoring role have little effect on performance or firm value. 
 Having directors who are not blockholders (DirOnlyNum) has no effect on ROA, but 
it has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q, which implies that the number of 
directors who are not blockholders matters.  The size of the coefficient implies that adding 
one more independent director increases Tobin’s Q by about 0.03 (See Table 7). This would 
imply that a company which started with the average Tobin’s Q of 0.94 could increase it to 
0.97, meaning that firm value would rise by about 3.2 per cent by adding another independent 
director. This finding is consistent with the view that an independent board may play a role in 
constraining large blockholders from expropriating small shareholders.  
 We also reformulate our DirOnlyNum variable into two parts, with variables for both 
the total number of directors (NumDir) and the proportion of the board who are active 
blockholders (PropDirBlock). This approach may suffer from a multi-collinearity problem as 
the correlation between ActiveBlock and PropDirectorsBlock is 0.857. The issue is similar if 
we use the proportion of directors who are not blockholders, just the direction of correlation 
is reversed. The results suggest again that having a greater number of directors is 
24 
 
significantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q (see column 8 of Table 7) which is 
consistent with the view that collusion is more difficult in larger groups. Having a larger 
board appears to make it more challenging to expropriate shareholders. 
 The ActiveCashWedge variable, which had no effect on ROA, does not have a 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q. These results are interesting because they suggest that 
voting rights that limited the power of large shareholders might not have been important 
covariates of valuation. One potential explanation is that most company constitutions 
permitted voting at AGMs to be by a show of hands and the complicated voting weights 
would only be applied if specifically requested, which may have somewhat attenuated the 
power of voting schemes which limited the power of large shareholders. In addition, there 
was a rapid decline in AGM attendance in Victorian Britain (Jefferys 1977, p. 396), which 
may have further blunted the power of voting schemes. The lack of influence of voting 
powers stands in contrast to the positive impact of independent directors. This is likely 
because it was the directors who were responsible for making almost all strategic decisions, 
with a vote at a company meeting usually only called to ratify what the directors had 
suggested.   
We carry out a series of robustness checks using alternative cutoff levels for a large 
blockholder. We consider cutoff points at the 5, 10 and 20 per cent levels, using both voting 
concentration and capital concentration measures. In Table 8  where ROA is the dependent 
variable, there are positive and statistically significant coefficients on ActiveBlock, indicating  
that large blockholders who are also directors have a positive effect on operating performance 
is robust to alternative definitions of what constitutes a large blockholder. Interestingly, 
whenever a large shareholder is defined as someone owning 20 per cent of the stock, 
DirOnlyVote (the percentage of votes held by those who are solely directors) has a positive 
effect on ROA at the 10 per cent level of significance.  This may simply be because some 
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blockholders are now included in the definition of DirOnlyVote. Table 9  reveals that the 
relationship between the DirOnlyNum variable and Tobin’s Q is not affected by changing the 
definition.   
 
<<Insert Tables 8 & 9>> 
 
As a further robustness check, we consider whether large passive blockholders in this 
study may have been rotating in and out of a directorship and therefore may have actually 
been active blockholders. To ensure this is not the case, we check all such blockholders for 
two years either side of each observation, using the Stock Exchange Yearbook and Directory 
of Directors, and find only three examples of a large passive blockholder being a director in 
this window. Where we have multiple observations, we also conducted analysis for those 
companies, which either gained or lost an active blockholder. We have three occasions where 
the company gains an active blockholder. The average increase in ROA is 7.9 percentage 
points.  At the same time, Tobin’s Q declines 0.18. We have five occasions where the 
company loses an active blockholder. The average decline in ROA is 4.2 percentage points, 
and an average increase in Tobin’s Q of 0.10. These results are exactly in line with our 
hypotheses and our empirical results. However, given the small sample sizes, we do not want 
to put too much emphasis on these findings.   Our results are robust also to the exclusion of 
banks and insurance companies.
26
    
As noted earlier, we use the final status of the company as a dependent variable to 
carry out a further robustness check. .  We use multinomial logit regressions to examine how 
ownership affects the ultimate fate of the company. The results shown in Tables 10 and 11 
reveal whether ownership structure made a company more or less likely to experience a 
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particular outcome, relative to the base outcome which we have chosen as merging with 
another firm. 
The first thing to note from Table 10  is that there is little statistical or economic 
relationship between broad ownership structure, as measured by VoteHHI, and the final status 
of the company; only VolWoundUp is significant and only at the 10 per cent level.  Using 
different measures of ownership structure, give similar results and are not reported separately. 
The proportion held by insiders (VoteInsiders) is only significant against VolWoundUp, 
whilst the proportion held by the five largest shareholders (VoteLargest5), or by directors 
(VoteDir), are not significant predictors of any outcome. The negative coefficient on NumDir 
in specifications 2 and 3 suggests that the greater the number of directors a company had, the 
less likely they were to be wound up by a court, or to be removed from the stock exchange.   
 
<<Insert Tables 10 & 11>> 
 
In Table 11 we examine the interaction of final status and director/blockholder 
interactions.  We find negative coefficients on the DirOnlyNum variable for those companies 
whose ultimate fate was to be wound up by a court or removed from the stock exchange year 
book, implying that the greater the number of directors who were not large blockholders, the 
less likely that the company was to experience failure.  In addition, the presence of large 
active blockholders is correlated with a lower probability of a company experiencing a 
negative ultimate outcome, although the coefficient on the ActiveBlock variable is only 
significant at the 10 per cent level. This would again suggest, consistent with the previous 
results, that the presence of a large active blockholder may have a positive influence on how 
the firm operates. 
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We conducted a survival analysis to examine if any of the governance variables had 
an impact on how long the company survived independently. However, none of the 
governance variables were significant, possibly because a large proportion of our sample 
companies ended by merging with another firm, or being acquired. This makes it difficult to 
interpret survival time, as companies which merged quite early did not necessarily have poor 
performance.   
 In summary, the results suggest that the presence of someone who is both a large 
shareholder and a director is associated with a higher ROA and less likelihood of 
experiencing a negative future state, but it does not result in a higher Tobin’s Q.  This implies 
that large active blockholders alleviate managerial agency problems and have a desire for 
survival in the long run, but their presence is not necessarily valued by other shareholders.  
Second, the number of directors who are not large shareholders is positively correlated with a 
higher Tobin’s Q and a lower probability of failure in the long run, which may imply that 
they were effective at preventing expropriation by large shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has addressed the debate of whether ownership structure mattered for firm 
performance in Victorian Britain. Our basic finding is that it was not the broad structure of 
corporate ownership which mattered for the performance of Victorian public companies, but 
whether a family blockholder had a governance role. Our results suggest that large family 
blockholders who were directors ensured that firms were well run and alleviated managerial 
agency problems.  However, minority shareholders in Victorian Britain appear not to have 
placed a high value on such firms, possibly because of the potential threat of expropriation. 
Indeed, minority shareholders seemed to prefer boards dominated by independent directors 
and not by large shareholders. This implies that independent directors played a useful 
economic function in Victorian Britain and were not just ornamental. 
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Firms dominated by family blockholders were relatively uncommon before the 1890s, 
as many public companies launched on the stock market from scratch before that time. 
However, blockholders became much more common from the 1890s onwards as the newly-
listed firms in this era were typically conversions of long-established firms, which had 
previously been partnerships (Acheson et al., 2015; Cheffins, 2008, p. 181). The implications 
of this change in the nature of stock-market flotation for British capital markets and economic 
development are something to be addressed in future research.               
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  Performance Data  Final Status Data 
    N Mean 1
st percentile Median 99th percentile St. Dev   N Mean 1st percentile Median 99th percentile St. Dev 
        
      Voting Concentration 
             
 VoteLargest5 (%) 245 21.44 1.21 17.28 89.40 16.70  344 24.73 1.06 18.36 98.67 20.81 
 VoteHHI (%) 245 3.08 0.14 1.36 35.00 5.89  344 4.19 0.13 1.52 54.40 8.17 
 
VoteDir (%) 245 11.53 0.00 6.99 69.04 12.00 
 
344 13.82 0.55 8.26 85.31 16.12 
 
VoteInsiders (%) 245 14.38 1.17 9.06 82.89 14.73 
 
344 18.85 0.88 10.45 98.00 20.97 
 
ActiveBlock (%) 245 3.76 0.00 0.00 57.31 10.50  344 5.43 0.00 0.00 84.11 15.44 
 
PassiveBlock (%) 245 2.85 0.00 0.00 57.72 9.62  344 4.69 0.00 0.00 63.28 11.83 
 
DirOnlyVote (%) 245 7.78 0.00 5.91 25.33 5.72 
 
344 8.40 0.00 6.67 30.79 6.55 
 ActiveCEOBlock (%) 242 1.45 0.00 0.00 39.22 5.77        
 ActiveNotCEOBlock (%) 242 2.02 0.00 0.00 49.71 7.45        
Number of Directors              
 NumDir 252 6.02 3.00 6.00 23.00 2.75  344 6.24 3.00 6.00 19.00 2.50 
 DirOnlyNum 245 5.84 2.00 5.00 23.00 2.88  344 5.97 1.00 6.00 19.00 2.69 
 PropDirBlock (%) 245 4.25 0.00 0.00 100.00 12.24        
Performance Variables              
 ROA (%) 252 4.97 -2.54 3.74 21.68 4.66        
 Q 217 0.94 0.28 0.91 2.49 0.34        
 Merged        344 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
 CourtWoundUp        344 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 
 Removed        344 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 
 VolWoundUp        344 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 
 Reconstructed        344 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 
Control Variables 
       
      
 
OwnDate 252 1892 1881 1890 1901 6.87 
 
344 1883 1862 1883 1901 10.6 
 
EstDate 249 1871 1824 1874 1897 16.91 
 
340 1871 1825 1872 1897 16.1 
 
Size (£000s) 251 256.70  16.96  150.00  1,806.98  301.68  
 
342 216.56 3.16 133.10 1,362.45 243.42 
 
DirectorQual 251 0.37 0.00 0.24 1.76 0.39 
 
342 0.43 0.00 0.27 2.54 0.51 
 
HeadLondon 250 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
 
298 0.54 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
 
Scottish 252 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 
 
344 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 
 
LTDebt (%) 252 13.52 0.00 0.04 73.31 18.94 
 
       ActiveCashWedge (%) 224 -0.29 -23.61 0.00 13.16 2.39  
 VoteNonLinear 245 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48        
 Uncalled 252 6.58 0.00 0.00 97.50 15.18        
Notes: Data is winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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TABLE 2 
DIRECTORS AND LARGE BLOCKHOLDERS BY INDUSTRY FOR THE POST-1880 PERFORMANCE SAMPLE 
              
  
  Mean number of individuals who were:   Mean % of votes controlled by:  Mean propensity of 
 
N  Solely a 
director 
 
 
 
(a) 
Passive 
Block 
holder 
 
 
(b) 
Active 
Block 
holder 
 
(c) 
Directors 
 
 
 
 
(a+c) 
Large 
block- 
holders 
 
 
(b+c) 
Insiders 
 
 
 
 
(a+b+c) 
 Solely a 
director 
 
 
 
(d) 
Passive 
Block 
holder 
 
 
(e) 
Active 
Block 
holder 
 
(f) 
Directors 
 
 
 
 
(d+f) 
Large 
block- 
holders 
 
 
(e+f) 
Insiders 
 
 
 
 
(d+e+f) 
 Director to 
be a large 
blockholder (%) 
 
 
c/(a+c) 
Large 
blockholder 
to be a 
director (%) 
 
c/(b+c) 
  
    
   
    
   
 
  
Banks 38  7.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 7.1  6.3 0.0 0.4 6.7 0.4 6.7  0.4 100.0 
Breweries 3  3.0 0.0 1.3 4.3 1.3 4.3  8.1 0.0 29.9 38.0 29.9 38.0  30.8 100.0 
Gas, Light & Coke 11  5.5 0.5 0.2 5.7 0.7 6.3  4.5 13.6 4.3 8.8 17.9 22.4  3.2 25.0 
Industrial & Commercial 63  4.7 0.3 0.5 5.2 0.7 5.5  8.3 5.3 8.0 16.3 13.3 21.6  8.8 64.4 
Insurance 15  12.7 0.0 0.1 12.9 0.1 12.9  8.5 0.0 1.8 10.2 1.8 10.2  1.0 100.0 
Iron, Coal & Steel 30  4.9 0.1 0.3 5.2 0.5 5.3  10.2 2.0 7.9 18.1 9.9 20.1  6.4 71.4 
Mines 10  5.0 0.1 0.1 5.1 0.2 5.2  6.1 1.5 2.2 8.3 3.7 9.9  2.0 50.0 
Mortgage & Finance 34  5.6 0.1 0.0 5.6 0.1 5.7  6.8 2.2 0.4 7.2 2.6 9.4  0.5 33.3 
Steamships 14  6.1 0.1 0.1 6.1 0.2 6.3  11.2 1.6 0.8 12.0 2.4 13.6  1.2 33.3 
Telegraph 7  5.9 0.4 0.0 5.9 0.4 6.3  5.0 12.1 0.0 5.0 12.1 17.0  0.0 0.0 
Tramways 13  4.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 4.7  4.2 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 4.2  0.0 - 
Wagon 7  5.0 0.0 0.1 5.1 0.1 5.1  14.8 0.0 2.2 17.0 2.2 17.0  2.8 100.0 
  
    
   
    
   
 
  
Total 245  5.9 0.1 0.2 6.1 0.4 6.2  7.8 3.0 4.0 11.8 7.0 14.8  3.5 60.5 
                   
Notes: The propensity for a director to be a large blockholder is calculated as (ActiveBlockholder)/(Solely Director + ActiveBlockholder) and the propensity for a large blockholder to be a director calculated as 
(ActiveBlockholder)/(Passive Blockholder + Active Blockholder). 
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TABLE 3 
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION MEASURES 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q VoteLargest5 (%) VoteHHI (%) VoteInsiders (%) VoteDir (%) ActiveBlock (%) PassiveBlock (%) DirOnlyVote (%) NumDir DirOnlyNum 
ROA 1.00           
Tobin’s Q 0.49*** 1.00          
VoteLargest5 (%) 0.06 -0.05 1.00         
VoteHHI (%) 0.03 -0.01 0.86*** 1.00        
VoteInsiders (%) 0.10 0.04 0.93*** 0.83*** 1.00       
VoteDir (%) 0.14** 0.06 0.69*** 0.49*** 0.76*** 1.00      
ActiveBlock (%) 0.16** 0.04 0.68*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 0.88*** 1.00     
PassiveBlock (%) -0.02 0.00 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.58*** -0.09 -0.03 1.00    
DirOnlyVote (%) 0.01 0.05 0.20*** -0.04 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.01 -0.13** 1.00   
NumDir 0.02 0.26*** -0.25*** -0.14** -0.12* -0.04 -0.09 -0.14** 0.09 1.00  
DirOnlyNum -0.01 0.25*** -0.34*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.25*** -0.13** 0.08 0.98*** 1.00 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  ROA  and Q are industry adjusted and outliers have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 4  
DETERMINANTS OF RETURN ON ASSETS AND TOBIN’S Q  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PANEL A         
         
VoteLargest5 0.002    0.002    
 (0.003)    (0.004)    
VoteHHI  0.002    0.002   
  (0.002)    (0.003)   
VoteInsiders   0.004*    0.004  
   (0.002)    (0.003)  
VoteDir    0.007***    0.007** 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
NumDir     0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EstDate     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size     0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DirectorQual     0.006 0.006 0.004 0.000 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
HeadLondon     0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Scottish     0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LTDebt     -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.024 0.030 0.029 0.034 -0.237 -0.206 -0.178 -0.095 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.394) (0.396) (0.363) (0.353) 
         
Year Dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 245 245 245 245 241 241 241 241 
R-squared 0.097 0.099 0.105 0.120 0.173 0.175 0.178 0.194 
 
PANEL B 
        
         
VoteLargest5 -0.047*    -0.035    
 (0.028)    (0.024)    
VoteHHI  -0.027    -0.023   
  (0.021)    (0.018)   
VoteInsiders   0.017    -0.009  
   (0.020)    (0.018)  
VoteDir    0.032    -0.022 
    (0.022)    (0.020) 
NumDir     0.029*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
ROA     4.003*** 4.010*** 3.974*** 4.038*** 
     (0.678) (0.681) (0.696) (0.698) 
EstDate     -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size     -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 -0.032 
     (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
DirectorQual     0.085 0.082 0.074 0.086 
     (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) 
HeadLondon     -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 
     (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
Scottish     0.015 0.018 0.024 0.022 
     (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
LTDebt     0.232** 0.236** 0.238*** 0.243*** 
     (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
Constant 0.147 0.115 0.261 0.293 1.600 2.060 2.934 2.642 
 (0.322) (0.335) (0.320) (0.321) (2.802) (2.708) (2.530) (2.464) 
         
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 212 212 212 212 211 211 211 211 
R-squared 0.107 0.099 0.095 0.100 0.399 0.398 0.395 0.397 
Notes: In Panel A industry-adjusted ROA is the dependent variable and in Panel B industry-adjusted Tobins’s Q is the dependent variable. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses  
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TABLE 5  
DIFFERENCES IN PERFORMANCE WITH ALTERNATIVE CONCENTRATION MEASURES 
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
 ROA   TOBIN’S Q  
Large Blockholder at: 5%  10%  20%   5%  10%  20%  
 N Mean  N Mean  N Mean   N Mean  N Mean  N Mean  
Companies with:                    
Panel A: Active Blockholders 
At least one Active 
Blockholder 
 
73 6.5%  37 7.6%  13 8.4%   59 0.94  30 0.93  8 0.90  
No Active Blockholders 172 4.3%  208 4.5%  232 4.8%   153 0.95  182 0.95  204 0.95  
 
Difference in means 
 
2.3% ***  3.1% ***  3.6% ***   -0.01   -0.01   -0.04  
Panel B: Passive Blockholders 
At least one Passive 
Blockholder 
 
93 5.6%  28 5.5%  9 4.4%   76 0.90  22 0.88  7 0.93  
No Passive Blockholders 152 4.5%  217 4.9%  236 5.0%   136 0.97  190 0.95  205 0.94  
 
Difference in means 
 
1.1% *  0.6%   -0.6%    -0.07   -0.07   -0.01 
 
Panel C: Solely Directors 
Above Median number of 
individuals who were 
Solely Directors 
 
108 4.8%  118 4.9%  75 4.8%   101 1.02  111 1.01  70 1.07  
Below Median number of 
individuals who were 
Solely Directors 
 
137 5.1%  127 5.0%  170 5.0%   111 0.87  101 0.87  142 0.88  
Difference in means  -0.3%   -0.2%   -0.3%    0.15 ***  0.14 ***  0.19 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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TABLE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF RETURN ON ASSETS, DISTINGUISHING THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN LARGE BLOCKHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
ActiveBlock 0.060**    0.302*** 0.285***  0.262*** 
 (0.027)    (0.090) (0.095)  (0.095) 
PassiveBlock  -0.021   -0.014 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.028)   (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
DirOnlyVote   0.015  -0.015 0.007 0.018 0.013 
   (0.042)  (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) 
DirOnlyNum    -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000  
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
ActiveCEOBlock       0.321*  
       (0.171)  
ActiveNotCEOBlock       0.278**  
       (0.139)  
ActiveCEOBlockSq       -0.894*  
       (0.497)  
ActiveNotCEOBlockSq       -0.510*  
       (0.284)  
NumDir        -0.000 
        (0.001) 
PropDirectorsBlock        0.021 
        (0.034) 
ActiveBlockSq     -0.558*** -0.513***  -0.501*** 
     (0.179) (0.180)  (0.173) 
ActiveCashWedge     -0.175 -0.160 -0.132 -0.169 
     (0.122) (0.112) (0.105) (0.113) 
DirFamily     -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
EstDate      0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size      0.000 0.001 0.000 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DirectorQual      -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
HeadLondon      0.007 0.007 0.007 
      (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Scottish      0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 
      (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LTDebt      -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
      (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.008 -0.138 -0.133 -0.141 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.396) (0.413) (0.398) 
         
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 245 245 245 245 224 221 219 221 
R-squared 0.119 0.097 0.095 0.095 0.168 0.239 0.234 0.239 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable is industry-adjusted ROA. All 
outliers have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
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TABLE 7  
DETERMINANTS OF TOBIN’S Q, DISTINGUISHING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
LARGE BLOCKHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
ActiveBlock 0.183    0.794 0.190  -0.707 
 (0.273)    (1.411) (1.401)  (1.899) 
PassiveBlock  -0.198   -0.084 0.041 0.041 0.042 
  (0.201)   (0.181) (0.171) (0.171) (0.175) 
DirOnlyVote   0.126  -0.312 -0.390 -0.392 -0.309 
   (0.352)  (0.341) (0.338) (0.328) (0.346) 
DirOnlyNum    0.025** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.032***  
    (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)  
ActiveCEOBlock       0.246  
       (2.614)  
ActiveNotCEOBlock       0.410  
       (1.392)  
ActiveCEOBlockSq       -4.590  
       (5.333)  
ActiveNotCEOBlockSq       -4.480  
       (3.385)  
NumDir        0.032*** 
        (0.011) 
PropDirectorsBlock        0.373 
        (0.506) 
ActiveBlockSq     -2.256 -0.637 2.838 0.515 
     (3.078) (3.009) (3.641) (3.616) 
ActiveCashWedge     -0.875 -0.536 -1.015 -0.659 
     (1.763) (1.509) (1.664) (1.421) 
DirFamily     -0.074 -0.048 -0.061 -0.074 
     (0.103) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) 
ROA     3.933*** 4.247*** 4.260*** 4.238*** 
     (0.720) (0.718) (0.723) (0.725) 
EstDate      -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size      -0.033 -0.029 -0.033 
      (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
DirectorQual      0.089 0.086 0.076 
      (0.071) (0.078) (0.071) 
HeadLondon      -0.017 -0.026 -0.019 
      (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Scottish      -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 
      (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) 
LTDebt      0.253** 0.253*** 0.250** 
      (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Constant 0.217 0.225 0.210 0.058 -0.018 2.682 2.599 2.554 
 (0.310) (0.312) (0.318) (0.320) (0.291) (2.705) (2.625) (2.727) 
         
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 212 212 212 212 193 192 191 192 
R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.092 0.145 0.374 0.409 0.415 0.410 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable is industry-adjusted Q.  ROA is the 
industry-adjusted ROA.  All outliers have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  “ 
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TABLE 8  
ROA ROBUSTNESS TESTS – ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF LARGE 
BLOCKHOLDERS 
 Voting Concentration Capital Concentration 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ActiveBlock 0.202*** 0.285*** 0.378** 0.215*** 0.300*** 0.332* 
 (0.065) (0.095) (0.190) (0.079) (0.115) (0.177) 
PassiveBlock 0.005 -0.020 -0.033 -0.001 -0.032 -0.034 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.047) 
DirOnlyVote -0.041 0.007 0.058 0.021 0.033 0.075* 
 (0.085) (0.048) (0.039) (0.082) (0.049) (0.041) 
DirOnlyNum 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ActiveBlockSq -0.316*** -0.513*** -0.782** -0.374** -0.591** -0.722* 
 (0.113) (0.180) (0.370) (0.173) (0.232) (0.382) 
ActiveCashWedge -0.181* -0.160 -0.148* -0.098 -0.090 -0.132* 
 (0.103) (0.112) (0.083) (0.061) (0.068) (0.076) 
DirFamily -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
EstDate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DirectorQual -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
HeadLondon 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Scottish 0.019** 0.017** 0.017** 0.020** 0.017* 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LTDebt -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant -0.067 -0.138 -0.190 -0.045 -0.138 -0.109 
 (0.399) (0.396) (0.405) (0.397) (0.395) (0.391) 
       
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.233 0.239 0.235 0.228 0.244 0.232 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variables are industry-
adjusted ROA and Q. All outliers have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
  
42 
 
TABLE 9  
TOBIN’S Q ROBUSTNESS TESTS – ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF LARGE 
BLOCKHOLDERS 
 Voting Concentration Capital Concentration 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ActiveBlock 0.141 0.190 0.457 -0.173 0.023 -0.108 
 (0.770) (1.401) (1.781) (0.733) (1.274) (1.437) 
PassiveBlock -0.105 0.041 0.160 -0.287** -0.061 0.026 
 (0.156) (0.171) (0.165) (0.141) (0.175) (0.168) 
DirOnlyVote -0.759 -0.390 -0.225 -0.852 -0.410 -0.301 
 (0.778) (0.338) (0.400) (0.763) (0.381) (0.422) 
DirOnlyNum 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
ActiveBlockSq -0.353 -0.637 -1.831 0.163 -0.573 -0.392 
 (1.665) (3.009) (3.857) (1.629) (2.802) (3.171) 
ActiveCashWedge -0.576 -0.536 -0.912 -0.568 -0.403 -0.400 
 (1.555) (1.509) (1.262) (1.486) (1.452) (1.056) 
DirFamily -0.044 -0.048 -0.047 -0.031 -0.028 -0.036 
 (0.076) (0.099) (0.068) (0.074) (0.086) (0.069) 
ROA 4.224*** 4.247*** 4.214*** 4.293*** 4.244*** 4.313*** 
 (0.706) (0.718) (0.732) (0.710) (0.733) (0.746) 
EstDate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size -0.033 -0.033 -0.030 -0.037 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
DirectorQual 0.096 0.089 0.086 0.102 0.089 0.089 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.073) (0.067) (0.069) (0.074) 
HeadLondon -0.018 -0.017 -0.020 -0.028 -0.026 -0.022 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) 
Scottish -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.024 -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) 
LTDebt 0.246*** 0.253** 0.253*** 0.237** 0.243** 0.249** 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.096) (0.094) (0.098) (0.096) 
Constant 2.193 2.682 2.861 1.799 2.380 2.652 
 (2.708) (2.705) (2.716) (2.669) (2.686) (2.651) 
       
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.411 0.409 0.410 0.417 0.411 0.409 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variables are industry-
adjusted ROA and Q.  
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TABLE 10 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS - FINAL STATUS OF THE COMPANY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Merged CourtWoundUp Removed VolWoundup Reconstructed 
      
VoteHHI  0.193 -0.004 -0.329* -0.332 
  (0.253) (0.165) (0.192) (0.210) 
NumDir  -0.538*** -0.361*** -0.106 -0.090 
  (0.151) (0.113) (0.086) (0.080) 
OwnDate  -0.136*** -0.090*** -0.098*** -0.081*** 
  (0.051) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
EstDate  0.030 0.031* 0.052*** 0.041*** 
  (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) 
Size  -0.019 -0.078 -0.061 -0.326 
  (0.319) (0.245) (0.208) (0.201) 
DirectorQual  -1.929* -0.252 -0.441 0.224 
  (0.984) (0.508) (0.456) (0.380) 
HeadLondon  -0.904 -0.682 -0.056 -0.328 
  (0.767) (0.422) (0.420) (0.464) 
Scottish  1.779* 0.859 1.086* 0.459 
  (0.954) (0.570) (0.568) (0.611) 
Constant  202.815** 114.369** 86.636** 77.811* 
  (95.166) (48.214) (43.523) (44.957) 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
Notes: These are the results from a multinomial logit regression which has the final status or ultimate fate of the company as 
a dependent variable and where we have one observation per company rather than one observation per ownership sample.  
Companies which merged are taken as the base group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses and the pseudo R-squared = 0.139.   
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TABLE 11 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS - FINAL STATUS OF THE COMPANY, 
DISTINGUISHING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LARGE BLOCKHOLDERS AND 
DIRECTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Merged CourtWoundUp Removed VolWoundup Reconstructed 
      
ActiveBlock  -4.652* -2.109* -2.114 -1.091 
  (2.664) (1.182) (2.026) (1.387) 
PassiveBlock  -0.820 -1.784 -1.930 -1.779 
  (2.134) (1.654) (1.396) (2.257) 
DirOnlyVote  8.760* -0.819 0.307 -2.441 
  (4.829) (3.115) (3.311) (3.343) 
DirOnlyNum  -0.643*** -0.391*** -0.086 -0.053 
  (0.163) (0.116) (0.092) (0.080) 
DirFamily  -0.193 0.037 -0.787 -1.462 
  (0.741) (0.476) (0.765) (0.896) 
OwnDate  -0.132*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.077*** 
  (0.048) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
EstDate  0.038 0.035** 0.051*** 0.041*** 
  (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) 
Size  0.071 -0.040 -0.020 -0.302 
  (0.310) (0.247) (0.207) (0.200) 
DirectorQual  -1.880** -0.227 -0.466 0.272 
  (0.948) (0.535) (0.446) (0.353) 
HeadLondon  -0.580 -0.651 -0.153 -0.487 
  (0.809) (0.433) (0.429) (0.459) 
Scottish  1.897* 0.957* 0.987* 0.281 
  (1.081) (0.582) (0.584) (0.621) 
Constant  178.053** 105.939** 78.952* 71.168 
  (90.240) (48.119) (43.365) (44.427) 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
Notes: These are the results from a multinomial logit regression which has the final status or ultimate fate of the company as 
a dependent variable and where we have one observation per company rather than one observation per ownership sample.  
Companies which survived are taken as the base group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses and the pseudo R-squared = 0.153.   
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APPENDIX 1 
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE DATA TO INVESTOR’S MONTHLY MANUAL DATA 
 
Performance Data 
 
Final Status Data 
 
IMM (1880) 
 
IMM (1900) 
                
 
N % 
Median  
Par Value 
 
N % 
Median  
Par Value 
 
N % 
Median  
Par Value 
 
N % 
Median  
Par Value 
                Banks 39 15.5 274,700 
 
49 14.2 228,568 
 
168 20.4 300,000 
 
133 10.5 412,773 
Breweries 3 1.2 139,880 
 
17 4.9 219,820 
 
5 0.6 340,000 
 
115 9.1 266,670 
Gas, Light & Coke 11 4.4 147,900 
 
15 4.4 130,000 
 
61 7.4 200,000 
 
71 5.6 350,000 
Industrial & Commercial 65 25.8 145,075 
 
117 34.0 103,883 
 
187 22.7 106,700 
 
412 32.6 200,000 
Insurance 16 6.3 100,000 
 
14 4.1 99,997 
 
97 11.8 100,000 
 
87 6.9 120,000 
Iron,Coal & Steel 31 12.3 155,860 
 
24 7.0 149,000 
 
59 7.2 210,000 
 
93 7.4 240,000 
Mines 10 4.0 110,857 
 
19 5.5 73,230 
 
77 9.4 100,000 
 
157 12.4 242,000 
Mortgage & Finance 35 13.9 130,731 
 
42 12.2 100,000 
 
57 6.9 112,500 
 
94 7.4 361,930 
Steamships 14 5.6 134,913 
 
15 4.4 188,440 
 
39 4.7 200,000 
 
39 3.1 466,420 
Telegraph 8 3.2 287,513 
 
10 2.9 200,000 
 
20 2.4 436,600 
 
19 1.5 800,000 
Tramways 13 5.2 122,028 
 
14 4.1 104,662 
 
30 3.6 135,000 
 
31 2.5 270,000 
Wagon 7 2.8 121,232 
 
8 2.3 90,619 
 
22 2.7 109,650 
 
13 1.0 125,436 
                Total 252 100.0 150,000 
 
344 100.0 133,099 
 
822 100.0 150,000 
 
1,264 100.0 250,000 
                Notes: Performance Data and Final Status Data shows the frequency of observations from each industry, and the median par value of equities and preference shares issued by those companies. 
Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) data shows the par value of equities and preference shares issued by non-railway corporations in 1880 and 1900. It does not include the value of corporate 
bonds, government bonds, railway securities or investment trusts.  
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APPENDIX 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Data sources 
Ownership variables  
VoteLargest5 Percentage of votes controlled by five largest shareholders OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
VoteHHI Herfindhal Index of voting rights (%) OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
VoteDir Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were directors OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
VoteInsiders Percentage of votes controlled by directors and large blockholders OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
ActiveBlock Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were directors and large 
blockholders 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
ActiveBlockSq ActiveBlock squared  
ActiveCEOBlock Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were CEOs and large 
blockholders 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
ActiveCEOBlockSq ActiveCEOBlock squared  
ActiveNotCEOBlock Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were directors and large 
blockholders but not CEOs 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
ActiveNotCEOBlockSq ActiveNotCEOBlock squared  
PassiveBlock Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were solely large 
blockholders 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
DirOnlyVote Percentage of votes controlled by individuals who were directors but not 
blockholders 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Directors  
NumDir Board size AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
DirOnlyNum Number of directors who were not large shareholders AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
PropDirBlock Proportion of board which are active blockholders AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
DirFamily The number of directors with the same surname as a blockholder AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
   
Performance variables  
ROA Return on assets (%) BCCA 
Q Tobin’s Q  BCCA, IMM 
Merged A binary variable = 1 if firm merged into another firm, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
CourtWoundUp A binary variable = 1 if firm was wound up by court order, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
Removed A binary variable = 1 if firm has been removed from SEY, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
VolWoundUp A binary variable = 1 if firm was voluntarily wound up, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
Reconstructed A binary variable = 1 if firm was reconstructed, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
   
Control variables   
OwnDate Year in which ownership census was taken OR 
EstDate Year in which company was established AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
Size Natural log of company par (paid-up) value  OR, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
DirectorQual Shareholding requirement for directors scaled by total paid-up capital AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
HeadLondon A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head office in London, 0 
otherwise 
AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
Scottish A binary variable which equals 1 if company is Scottish, 0 otherwise OR 
LTDebt Long-term debt as a percentage of total capital BCCA, IMM 
ActiveCashWedge Proportion of capital owned minus votes controlled by active blockholders OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
VoteNonLinear A binary variable = 1 if each share did not have equal voting rights, 0 
otherwise 
OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
Uncalled Difference between the nominal and par value of a share OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Notes: AoA = Articles of Association; BCCA = Burdett’s Collection of Company Accounts at the Guildhall Library; BOI = Burdett’s 
Official Intelligence; EG = Edinburgh Gazette: LG = London Gazette; IMM = Investor’s Monthly Manual; OR = ownership returns from 
national archives; RDC = Register of Defunct Companies; SEOI = Stock Exchange Official Intelligence; SEY = Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
 
 
